Yet the courts tell us that the Twenty-first Amendment is not to be read literally or invoked as a shield for protectionist legislation. Only laws designed to promote "temperance," they say, are protected by the Amendment from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. 7 Where did the district courts get the idea for this distinction-between "good" alcohol legislation, which furthers the state's legitimate "core" interest in temperance, and is protected under the Twenty-first Amendment, and "bad" legislation motivated by simple economic protectionism and thus constitutionally impermissible? Certainly not from the text of the Amendment, whose wording makes no such distinction. Not from the Framers of the Twenty-first Amendment, whom the recent court decisions barely discuss. 8 Not from Congress, which recently opened the federal courts to state attorneys general to enforce state legislation against out-of-state alcohol shippers. 9 Rather, it is the Supreme Court, in a series of decisions beginning over thirty years ago, that has constrained the operation of the Amendment to such a degree that it has become an '"almost' forgotten clause of the Constitution." 10 Yet, shortly after the Amendment's ratification, when the Court was first called upon to interpret it, no less a gray eminence than Mr. Justice Brandeis turned aside a number of challenges to allegedly protectionist state liquor legislation, arguing that to make the distinctions made by recent lower courts, would be to effect not a "construction" of the Amendment, but a "rewriting" of it.
11
To put it plainly, recent lower court decisions have indulged in broad applications of the Supreme Court's own narrow interpretations of the Twenty-first Amendment-fashioned in cases whose facts went beyond the explicit text of the AmendmentAmerican ConslilLl/ional Law § 1-12, at 36 n.15 (Foundation Press, 3rd ed., 20<Xl).
7. Sec, e.g., Bridenbaugh, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 831-32; Shanker, 85 Va. L. Rev. at 383 (cited in note 3) ("'There is only one reason to distinguish alcohol from other commodities in terms of federal power over interstate commerce: the state's interest in promoting temperance.").
8. Sec Part IV. 9. Sec, e.g., S. 577, 106th Cong., 2d Scss. (March 2, 2000) (providing for federal injunctive relief to state attorneys general to stop the importation or transportation of liquor into or through their state in violation of state law); Douglass, 49 Duke L.J. at 1653-59 (cited in note 3) (describing debate over the so-called "Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act").
I 0. Duckwonh v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 399 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson was expressing his displeasure at his brethren for making inroads on the power of the states granted to them under his reading of the Amendment.
II. Sec notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
and have erroneously concluded that those decisions dictate the invalidation of state liquor importation laws. That courts continue to construe narrowly-nearly to the vanishing point-a specific reservation of state power at federalism's high tide of judicial enforceability, seems particularly worthy of attention. The growing market for interstate shipment of alcohol, and the near unanimity of federal courts in their continued assertions of the Twenty-first Amendment's irrelevance, makes this an appropriate time for a reexamination of the Amendment and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it.
In this essay, I will do three things. First, I will summarize the history of the framing and ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment. Its purposes were well understood to go beyond merely allowing states to pursue temperance policies. At the time, the question was understood to be whether the states or the federal government would control the liquor trade. Second, I will chart the evolution of the Supreme Court's Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence and describe the Court's move from rules to standards in applying the Amendment. The adoption of the more flexible approach, I will show, has resulted in a dramatic reduction of state power over alcohol. Finally, I will critique the district court decisions that limit states in the one area in which their power remained largely unquestioned by the Supreme Court-the regulation of liquor imports from out-of-state. If these recent decisions are affirmed, the result will be the functional repeal of the Twenty-first Amendment. In hopes of averting this, I offer suggestions to lower courts and to the Supreme Court for applying the Amendment in future cases.
I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF ALCOHOL BEFORE PROHIBITION
States began to regulate the sale of alcohol in the nineteenth century, sometimes prohibiting it altogether, under their police power. 12 Many states exempted "personal users" from their liquor laws, which tended to restrict only wholesalers and retailers. But when states attempted to expand their laws and prohibit importation of out-of-state liquor for in-state delivery, the Supreme Court struck down the import bans as direct regulations of interstate commerce.
13 "The absence of any law of Congress on the subject is equivalent to its declaration that commerce in that matter shall be free," held the Court in Leisy v. Hardin.
14 Alarmed, states pressed Congress for permission to freely regulate alcohol. Congress responded with the Wilson Act of 1890, 15 which gave states the right to regulate liquor the moment it arrived in the state "to the same extent and in the same manner as though such ... liquor had been produced" there, regardless whether such liquor was in its "original package" or not.
16
A year later, In re Rahrer 17 blessed this "reconveyance" of regulatory power by Congress to the states. Through the exercise of its commerce power, the Court reasoned, Congress was free to "divest" an article of commerce of its interstate characteristics. 18 Despite the Wilson Act, the Court later struck down more state laws restricting the importation of liquor for personal use, again prompting congressional action. In 1898, the Court invali-13. Sec, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) (invalidating an Iowa law restricting local manufacture, importation, and sale of liquor, as applied to Illinois beer seized in Iowa); Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888) (invalidating an Iowa law prohibiting railroads from importing liquor unless accompanied by a certificate that consignee was licensed to sell liquor). Sec Richard F. Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment 56 (U. North Carolina Press, 1995) ("The U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal interstate commerce power shaped the course of the prohibition movement. .
[T]he brewers, after failing to establish a Fourteenth Amendment right to make liquor, turned to the federal commerce power to curtail the effects of state prohibition."). Hamm writes that "[w]ithin a month of [Leisy] , 'original package houses' and 'supreme court saloons' had sprung up in every prohibition state." !d. at 69. According to Hamm, Bowman "became a powerful wedge for them to usc to force their wares into dry states. Liquor in transit could not be legally seized nor could it be stopped at the state ·s borders." !d. at 66.
14. Leisy, 135 U.S. at 119. Sec Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment at 56-57 (cited in note 13) (cases like Bowman and Leisy "define[ d) the limits of state action over liquor so as to insure freedom of commerce within the nation and protect the federal government's power to regulate commerce"; at the same time, they "created a national crisis over liquor control and prompted Congress to act.").
15. 26 Stat. 313 (1890). Sec Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment at 57 (cited in note 13) ("The Supreme Court's interstate commerce decisions created an 'original package business' that threatened all liquor controls and created a crisis in alcohol policy" resulting in the passage of the Wilson Act, which inaugurated "a system of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over liquor.").
16. 26 Stat. 313 (1890). The reference to the "original package" was necessary because of Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Brown v. Maryland that goods were immune from state taxation so long as they were in their original packages. The doctrine, now discarded, was expanded by subsequent courts, and was an important part of the Court's early dormant Commerce Clause doctrine jurisprudence.
17. 140 U.S. 545 (1891 ). 18. ld. at 562. dated a South Carolina law that prohibited the shipment of liquor into the state, as applied to consignment shipments to individuals for personal use. 19 Cong,ress eventually responded with the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, 2 which prohibited the "shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any means whatsoever" of liquor "from one State, Territory, or District of the United States" into another "in violation of any law" of the State, Territory, or District. 21 The Court upheld the Webb-Kenyon Act in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co., relying in part on the assertion in In Re Rahrer that Congress could "divest" commodities of their interstate character, so as to permit state regulation otherwise forbidden by the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. 22 Two years after Clark Distilling Co., the Eighteenth Amendment was ratified, and nationwide prohibition became the law of the land.
23 Proposed in part as a sop to "drys" around the country and partly as a "war measure necessary for the saving of food and man power," 24 this social experiment soon ran into problems of widespread noncompliance, the rise of criminal rackets to satisfy the demand for alcohol, and the unwillingness of legislatures to appropriate_ resources for a real attempt to force nationwide compliance.
2 )
It took the Great Depression, however, to effect the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment and bring an end to the "noble experiment"of Prohibition.
26

II. THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
The election of 1932 was a mandate for radical reform of America's experiment with prohibition; both the GOP and Democratic Party platforms had called for its repeal. The Senate Judiciary Committee went to work; and by February, 1933, it reported out Senate Joint Resolution 211, which would have repealed prohibition, prohibited the importation of alcohol into states in violation of state law, and allowed for concurrent federal power "to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor to be drunk on the premises where sold"-a provision squarely aimed at ensuring that, no matter what, the Nation would be spared the return of the dreaded "saloon." It was this provision, then Section Three of the proposed Amendment, that proved to be the most controversial. The reasons for its eventual abandonment refute the notion that the Amendment was concerned only with promoting temperance or constitutionalizing the Webb-Kenyon Act. There arc several problems with the analysis of the commentators who take this view. First, it cannot be denied that Section Two of the Amendment reads differently than docs the Webb-Kenyon Act. Second, the support they amass for the "constitutionalization of Webb-Kenyon" thesis is meager-it often consists of one or two ambiguous remarks of Senators. Sec, e.g., Freeman, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. at374 & n.100. Finally, most commentators fail to examine closely the debate surrounding the third section of the proposed amendment reported out by the Senate Judiciary Committee. The reasons senators expressed for opposing the concurrent exercise of enforcement power by the state and federal government sheds a good deal of light on the purpose behind Section Two, and on the question whether it was simply meant to insure that dry states would have their right to be dry guaranteed by the Constitution. Wet states, too, had an interest in ensuring control over their own alcohol policies free from the specter of federal interference. Sec notes 33-51 and accompanying text.
28. Sec, e.g., 75 Cong. Rec. 4141 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine) (speaking in favor of the Amendment "to assure the so-called dry States against the importation of intoxicating liquor into those States" and that it is necessary to insure agai~st a hostile decision by the Supreme Court); id at4170 (statement of Sen. Borah) (noting that Section Two is necessary; otherwise "we arc turning the dry States over for protection to a law [i.e., the Webb-Kenyon Act] which is still of doubtful constitutionality and which, as it cohol, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine was to be inoperative. As S.J. 211's sponsor, Senator John J. Blaine, explained it:
When our government was organized and the Constitution of the United States was adopted, the States surrendered control over and regulation of interstate commerce. This proposal is restoring to the States ... the right to regulate commerce respecting a single commodity-namely, intoxicating liquor. ... [ Second, the section purporting to grant concurrent power to the states and the Federal Government to regulate the "saloon" was eliminated because of fears that it would invite congressional encroachment onto the states' regulatory prerogatives that Section Two was supposed to secure.
30
Even the Senate manager of S.J. 211, Senator Blaine, spoke at length in opposition to Section Three. In his "personal opinion," said Blaine, section 3 is ... contrary to section 2 of the resolution .... The purpose of section 2 is to restore to the States by constitutional amendment absolute control in effect over interstate commerce affecting intoxicating liquors which enter the confines of the States. . . . Thus, the States are granted larger power ... and are given greater protection, while under section 3 the proposal is to take away from the States the powers that the States would have in the absence of the eighteenth amendment. My view ... is that section 3 is inconsistent with section 2, and that section 3 ought to be taken out of the resolution.31 was upheld by a divided court, might very well be held unconstitutional upon a representation of it"; and "we arc asking dry Stales to rely upon the Congress of the United Stales to maintain indefinitely the Webb-Kenyon law," possibly in the face of strong pressure to repeal); id. at 4172 (statment of Sen. Borah) ("Therefore, if we arc to have what we arc now promised, local self-government, State rights, the right of the people of the respective Stales to adopt and enJOY their own policies, we must have ... some other provision of the Constitution, than those which existed prior to the adoption of the eighteenth amendment.").
29 39 Senator Blaine conceded that federal law would likely prevail. 40 Senator WaRner thus concluded that "the word 'concurrent' is meaningless."
Opponents of Section Three pointed out that since the proposed amendment would give both the state and federal government equal power, it was not at all clear that ordinary preemption rules applied. If they did, then the result was equally unacceptable, because it provided a backdoor for federal power, which could overwhelm state regulatory efforts. Senator Blaine pronounced Sections Two and Three "inconsistent" and "in- Therefore, language about "concurrent" power notwithstanding, federal laws would prevail if there was a conflict. Then "the States of this Union will be helpless," concluded Black, because "they can not regulate the sale of liquor within their own boundaries, nor can they prohibit it." 48 By one vote, senators' insistence on an unambiguous grant of power over liquor to the states overcame everyone's professed horror at the prospect of the saloon's return, and Section Three was struck from S.J. 211. 49 Following removal of Section Three, the Senate approved the measure 63 (Sept. 19, 1932) (noting views of New York supporter of repeal that "the first subsequent duty of the States is to prepare to resume regulation of the liquor traffic" and that "[t]heir authority in that province ... must be sole and undtvided. No further Federal intrusion on it must be tolerated."); Unrepealing Repeal, N.Y. Ttmes ~ 4, at 4 (Jan. 8, 1933) (editorial critical of proposed Section Three; concluding that "Federal prohibition is to be destroyed by retaining it in part. ... It leaves the regulation of the liquor traffic partly in the hands of the States, partly in the hands of the Federal Government."; terming it a ''two-faced and dishonest repeal"); ''Modified Repeal," N.Y.
* * *
Prior to the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine had restricted state authority over the importation of alcohol into their territory, which undermined state regulatory efforts and eroded congressional protections for bolder state law enforcement efforts.
When structuring the repeal of Prohibition, Congress heeded the demands of states that the Amendment secure states power over alcohol that would be immune from a Congress dominated by wets or drys, which may repeal or greatly expand congressional statutes like the Webb-Kenyon Act, and insulate state alcohol regulation from dormant Commerce Clause challenges that had bedeviled enforcement efforts prior to Prohibition. Proponents of state control vigorously (and successfully) opposed an attempt to give Congress "concurrent" authority over the "saloon," in large part for fear that congressional power would eventually eclipse the power of the states over alcohol. The message from Congress, the state ratifying conventions, and the text of the Amendment itself seemed clear: Liquor was different. In the years immediately,,following ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, the Supreme Court's opinions confirmed this consensus.
Times 18 (Jan. II, 1933) (arguing that, as reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the amendment continues Prohibition in part; claiming that Section Two is superfluous because Webb-Kenyon was still in effect, and that the proposed Section Three "prolongs the power of Federal Prohibition"; noting that "There is likely to be a perpetual effort to restore the old regime." It was enough that "the Federal hand is not to be taken off the throats of the States, that they are not to be free to deal, each in its own way, with the liquor traffic, is more than enough to condemn this section. 
III. THE COURT INTERPRETS THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
Soon after the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, the Supreme Court rejected several challenges to state liquor regulation. Possible protectionist motives for the regulations notwithstanding, the Court held that the Amendment was intended to return total control over liquor to the States. Beginning in the 1940s, however, the Court instead applied the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to state regulations not directly related to importation of liquor into the state for delivery or use. While many regulations were upheld, the door was open to challenge "unreasonable" alcohol regulations. In the mid-1960s, a pair of decisions that ostensibly protected the States' "core" Twenty-first Amendment power over importation struck down state regulations of alcohol imports for the first time since the 1890s. These cases contained language employed in later cases to invalidate state liquor regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause.
A. THE YOUNG'S MARKET CASES In State Board of Equalization of California v. Young's Market Co.
, 52 California's $500 license-fee for the privilege of importing beer from outside the state was upheld against Fourteenth Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges. "Prior to the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment," Justice Brandeis wrote, "it would obviously have been unconstitutional to have imposed any fee" on importation, "because the fee would be a direct burden on interstate commerce. " 53 The Amendment, he continued, "abrogated the right to import free ... intoxicating liquors. " 54 The plaintiffs, on the other hand, were asking the Court to read the Amendment to authorize only state prohibition in toto, "but if it permits ... manufacture an~ sale, it must let imported liquors compete ... on equal terms. "~5 To adopt this argument, he concluded, "would involve not a construction of the amendment, but a rewriting of it. " Brandeis, the greater power of total prohibition surely entailed lesser restrictions, including state monopoly of manufacture and sale, prohibition on importations, high taxation on imports, and partial prohibition. 57 Two years later, when a Minnesota statute discriminating against out-of-state liquor was challenged, Justice Brandeis wrote that Young's Market had "settled" the question whether "under the amendment, discrimination against imported liquor is permissible although it ~s not an incident of reasonable regulation of the liquor traffic. "~8
In 1939, the Court reaffirmed the holding of Young's Market in a pair of opinions also written by Justice Brandeis.
59 Upholding a Missouri ban on the alcohol imports from states that themselves had discriminatory import policies, Justice Brandeis held the alleged discriminatory intent of the Missouri statute to be entirely beside the point.
6°
Following the Twenty-first Amendment, he wrote, "the right of a State to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the commerce clause. "
61 In a companion case decided the same day involving a similar Michigan statute, Brandeis wrote that "the right of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the commerce clause; and ... discrimination between domestic and imported intoxicating liquors, or between imported intoxicating liquors, is not prohibited by the equal protection clause. " 62 auguratcd ··a tariff war in regard to liquor commerce") (footnote omitted).
57. See Young's Market, 299 U.S. at63 ("If it may permit the domestic manufacture and sale of beer and exclude all made without the state, may it not, instead of absolute exclusion, subject the foreign article to a heavy importation fcc"l").
58. Further, she may adopt measures reasonably appropriate to effectuate these inhibitions and exercise full police authority in respect of them." I d. at 138. Despite the fact that the Kentucky law governed exports, Justice McReynolds contended that, again, the power to absolutely prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicants encompassed myriad lesser powers, including the restrictions adopted here by Kentucky.
The only "limit" the Court placed on the Amendment during the 1930s resulted from the Court's holding that the Amendment did not apply in a federal enclave, like a national park.
63
Given this unambiguous early construction of the Amendment by the Court, it is surprising that later Courts have characterized the intent of Section Two as "obscur[ e]" and claimed that "[n]o clear consensus" concerning its meaning "is apparent."
64 Even if the legislative intent had been somewhat ambiguous (which it was not), 65 Many early commentators found the Court's conclusion that the Twenty-first Amendment abrogated the Fourteenth Amendment the most troubling part of the Young's Market line of cases. Sec, e.g., Crabb, 12 U. Oct. L.J. at 28 (cited in note 27) (arguing that "the words of the Amendment do[ J not appear to sanction discrimination whose purpose it is to secure commercial advantage to the domestic product over the foreign" and that such laws would, but for Young's Market, ct al., violate the Equal Protection Clause); Wiser and Arledge, 7 Gco. Wash. L. Rev. at 413-14 (cited in note 27) (concluding that the Twenty-first Amendment "deals with public health and morals, not with economics and commerce" whose undoubted purpose was to allow states freedom to exercise police and taxing powers, but not to grant discriminatory powers that violate other constitutional provisions, like the Fourteenth Amendment); Note, 27 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 130-31 (cited in note 27) ("By determining that state power over liquor traffic is not limited by the Commerce Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, the courts have sown the seeds of internal con!licts between the states.").
63 (1984) . That the legislative history of the Twenty-first Amendment in general, and of Section Two in particular, is unclear or ambiguous is a familiar refrain in nearly all of the commentary on it. Sec, e.g., Douglass, 49 Duke L.J. at 1631 (cited in note 3) (claiming that the legislative history "supports three distinct intcrpn:tations of section two"); id. at 1636 (asserting that no "single, correct interpretation of the effect of the Amendment had on state authority to regulate commerce in alcoholic beverages following the repeal of Prohibition" is possible from either text or legislative history); id. at 1659 ("Neither the plain meaning of the text of the Twenty-first Amendment nor its legislative history resolves whether, and to what extent, the Amendment created a Dormant Commerce Clause exception for state regulations of commcrc~.: in alcoholic bewrages."); Freeman, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. at 361 (cited in note 27) (stating that "the drafters of the Amendment did not leave a clear record of their intent in including Section Two"); id. at 374 (claiming that "the haste and festivity of the movement toward repeal obscured the debates in the states") (footnote omitted); DavidS. (1941 ) . The regulations required, for example, the usc of the most direct routes through the state, the carrying of bills of lading, the posting of bond, and the identification of the consignees who had to be able to kgally take possession of the alcohol at the place of delivery. Sec Carter, 321 U.S. at 133-34; Duckworth, 314 U.S. at 392. Abuses of the mail-order liquor trade that flourished before passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act and before the ratification of th<.: Eighteenth Amendment, as well as fear of diversion for illicit usc, were largely responsible for these regulations. Sec Bickel and Schmidt, History of the Supreme Court at 440 (cited in note 19); Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment at 69-79, 178-88 (cited in note 13).
One commentator maintains that the "seeds of retreat" were sown in the Ziffrin case, in which Kentucky's liquor control statute was upheld as applied to liquor manufactured for export, since the case "appeared to apply a reasonableness test" to the regulations. Sidney J. Spaeth But there arc problems with this reading of Ziffrin. First, the alcohol being regula:cd was subject to export, thus the very subject of regulation was not within the text of Section Two, which addressed importation for "delivery or usc therein," not exports. Nevertheless, Justice McReynolds felt that the power exercised by the state flowed from the Twenty-first Amendment. Sec Ziffrin, 308 U.S. at 138 (''The Twenty-first Amendment sanctions the right of a state to legislate concerning intoxicating liquors brought from without, unfettered by the Commerce Clause .... Further, she may adopt measures reasonably appropriate to effectuate these inhibitions and exercise full police authority in respect of them."). Read in context, Justice McReynolds' usc of the term "reasonably appropriate" hardly seems intended to restrict state power. Contemporary commentators also read Ziffrin as further expanding the Court's previous broad constructions of the Twenty-first Amendment. Sec, e.g., Crabb, 12 U. Oct. L.J. at 17 (cited in note 27) (remarking that Ziffrin "has made state ... regulatory statutes applicable to liquor within the state destined for exportation. This decision is in keeping with the general policy followed by the Supreme Court in giving a broad interpretation to the Amendment"); Note, 53 Harv. L. Rev. at 672 (cited in note 62) (restating the logic of !he holding: "because of the unrestricted power to prohibit imports and the power to forbid manufacture even for export ... a state may effectively prevent any exportation, and that if it may prohibit, it may permit such exports subject to any condition it wishes"; though inconsistent with doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, Court able to avoid discussion of doctrine because of the "extensive control over other aspects of the liquor traffic given the states by Acts of Congress and the Twenty-first Amendment").
prohibit "reasonable" police measures. State regulations of through 67. Sec Carter, 321 U.S. at 135 ("W.: have recognized that the several slates in the absence: of federal legislation may require regulatory liccnses for through shipments of liquor in order to guard agamsl violations of their own laws."); Duckworth, 314 U.S. at 394 ("While thc commerce clause has been interpretcd as reserving to Congress the power to regulate: interstate: ~ommercc in matters of national importance, that has never been deemed to exclude the stales from regulating primarily matters of local concern with respect to which Congress has not exercised its power, even though the regulation has some effect on interstate commerce.").
68. Duckworth, 314 U.S. at 393. 69. Sec Duckworth, 314 U.S. at 399 (Jackson, J., concurring) (''Transportation itself prescnt.:d no special danger~ or hazards, but it might be a step in evading and undermining a policy as to usc sale of liquor which the slate has a right to prescribe for itself. Regulated transportation is a necessary incident of regulated consumption and distribution.").
70. Sec Carter, 321 U.S. at 140-41 (Frankfurter. J., concurring). 71. The legislation is sustainable under the Twenty-first Amendment on one of two considerations.. . Since we arc dealing with a constitutional amendment that should be broadly and colloquially interpreted, liquor that enters a State in the manner in which the liquor h.:re came into Virginia may, without undu.: liberty with the English language, be deemed for "delivery" there even though it is consigned for another State .. In th.: alt.:rnativ.:, sine.: Virginia has power to prohibit the importation of liquor within that Comr.10nwealth, it may effectuate that purpose by measures deemed by it necessary to prevent evasion of its policy by pretended throughshipments .... !d. at 140-42 (Frankfurtcr, J, concurring). Justice Jackson warned that by characterizing the through-shipment regulations as acceptable exercises of stale "police powers," the Court was sending thc Twcnty-first Amcndmcnt "on [its] way to becoming another ·al-most forgotten' clausc of the Constitution.... It certainly applies to nothing else.'' Duckworth, 314 U.S. at399 (Jackson. J., concurring).
72. McCulloch v. Mary/and, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (noting that "the powers given to the gover~menl imply the ordinary means of execution"). The Court could also have found support for reliance on the Twenty-first Amendment in Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves. 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939) , where the Court upheld Kentucky regulations limiting the transportation of liquor ow of the state without complying with a number of requirements. "Having power absolutely to prohibit manufacture, sale, transportation, or possession of intoxicants," the Court concluded, it was "imperative" that the Court allow the state "to permit these things only under definitely prescribed conditions." Id. It hardly would have required judicial sorcery to uphold Virginia or Arkansas's regulations shipments to prevent diversion, they might have argued, are "necessary and proper" to the enforcement of states' liquor laws.
73
The through-shipment cases were important for the future of the Court's Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence because they suggested (pace the Court's earlier decisions) that a state's regulation of the liquor trade was still partly subject to the strictures of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Thereafter, state regulations not clearly governing importation for delivery or use were subject to scrutiny for reasonableness. 74 Such qualifications were not lost on academic commentators who urged the Court to intervene when economic protectionism, rather than temperance, seemed the primary factor motivating state regulations.75
by extending the reasoning in Ziffrin. In retrospect, Ziffrin was the high water mark of the Court's willingness to expand the scope of the power granted by the Twenty-first Amendment.
73. Justice Frankfurter also took the Court to task for assuming the "impossibk task" of adjudicating, by way of a vague balancing test, the reasonableness of the state's regulation of its liquor traffic. Carter, 321 U.S. at 143 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). "Such canons of adjudication," he wrote, "open wide the door of conflict and confusion which have ... characterized the liquor controversies in this Court and in no small measure formed part of the unedifying history which led first to the Eighteenth and then to the Twenty-first Amendment." !d. at 142 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The introduction of the balancing test probably owes to the inllucncc of Justice Stone, who wrote the Duckworth opinion, and who, at the time, was persuading his colleagues on the Court to applying an all-things-considered balancing test when assessing the validity of state regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Sec 75. Sec, e.g., Crabb, 12 U. Oct. L.J. at 26 (cited in note 27) (commenting that discriminatory liquor laws "have no perceptible relation to the protection of a dry or regulatory state policy"); Note, 27 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 132-33 (cited in note 27) (discriminatory liquor laws ought not be shielded from application of unconstitutional conditions duetrine); Note, 55 Yale L.J. at 816 (cited in note 27) (urging "redefinition" of liquor regulation power "grounded on the conception that state liquor legislation escapes the interdict of the Commerce Clause and other state eonstitutionallimitations only when representing a valid exercise of state police power"; "it would not require boldness beyond the capacity of the Supreme Court to interpolate the word 'proper' to modify 'laws'" in Section Two) (footnote omitted); Vcrsfelt, 75 Colum. L. Rev. at 1585 (cited in note 64) ("Plenary state authority over imports was designed to free the states to protect their citizens from the harmful effects of unregulated imported liquor. The social dangers which prompted the amendment exist whenever liquor enters a state, regardless of origin."). 
77
On the same day, for the first time in over sixty years (and for the first time since the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment), the Court struck down two state liquor control laws.
78
While purporting to preserve states' core Twenty-first Amendment power over importation, both opinions offered a revisionist interpretation of the Amendment that is at odds with both its history and early Supreme Court interpretations. When severely circumscribing the very state power the Court left undisturbed, lower courts now quote liberally from these cases.
Hostetter arose when the State of New York attempted to shut down a duty-free liquor store ("Idlewild") that operated out of John F. Kennedy International Airport. 79 whether the Twenty-first Amendment so far obliterates the Commerce Clause as to empower New York to prohibit absolutely the passage of liquor through its territory, under the supervision of the United States Bureau of Customs acting under federal law, for delivery to customers in foreign countries.
85
To draw from these cases the conclusion, he wrote, "that the Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Commerce Clause" in cases involving liquor "would ... be an absurd oversimplification." 86 That would mean that "Congress would be left with no regulatory power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating liquor," a result Stewart found to be "patently bizarre" and "demonstrably incorrect." 89 This led Stewart to "a like conclusion" because "ultimate delivery and use is not in New York but in a foreign country" and New York "has not sought to regulate or control the passage of intoxicants through her territory" to prevent diversion.
90
"Rather, the State has sought totally to prevent transactions carried on under the aegis of a law passed by Congress in the exercise of its explicit power ... to regulate commerce with foreign nations. This New York cannot constitutionally do. "
91
Note the difference that rephrasing the question made. Justice Stewart conceded that if the issue was merely state regulation of imports for delivery or use in New York, the state would have prevailed under the Young's Market line of cases. However, he avoided the Young's Market precedents (i) by claiming that through-shipment, not importation, was involved; (ii) by implying that New York's liquor laws were to some degree preempted by the federal customs regulations enacted; and (iii) by implying that the involvement of the Customs Bureau converted JFK into some sort of federal enclave.
Yet, upon close examination, it becomes apparent that if there are any "patently bizarre" conclusions and "absurd oversimplifications" in Hostetter, they are contained in Justice Stewart's opinion. First, Justice Stewart utterly mischaracterized the nature of Idlewild's operation. While it might be true that no liquor was bought by Idlewild for "use" in New York (since presumably any use would take place at the final destination, when the liquor was claimed by the purchaser), there was "delivery," for purposes of Section Two of the Amendment, of the liquor to Idlewild's warehouse, where it sat as inventory until purchased and loaded onto international flights. Then there is Stewart's discussion of the relationship between the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause. To frame the question in terms of the Amendment's "repealing" the Commerce Clause clouds the issue. The evidence seems clear that, inasmuch as the importation of alcohol is involved, the Twenty-first Amendment created an "exception" to the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. 93 It was that doctrine, after all, that earlier Courts had used to frustrate state regulation of the alcohol trade.
94
The source of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, moreover, is the delegation of power over commerce to Congress in Article I, § 8. So, in one sense, the Twenty-first Amendment did effect a "repeal" of at least some of the Commerce Clause's implicit limits on state power. Ct.) ("We arc of opinion, that this Commonwealth, in adopting and promulgating its system for regulation, restraint and control of intoxicating liquors, in the exercise of its police power, had the right and authority to provide that it should be unlawful for any one Stewart was correct when he wrote that "if the commodity involved here were not liquor, but grain or lumber, the Commerce Clause, would clearly deprive New York" of its regulatory power. 96 His observation, however, isn't relevant to the constitutionality of New York's regulation of Idlewild. New York sought to regulate the importation of alcohol; and alcohol, the Twenty-first Amendment makes clear, is different.
Is it "absurd" to conclude that Congress's commerce power was qualified by the Twenty-first Amendment as it would be by other J?rovisions of the Constitution, like the First Amendment? Suppose that Congress exercised its commerce power in an attempt to force states to accept imports of intoxicating beverages, regardless of what state law said. Would that congressional act preempt contrary state law? If the Amendment was intended to mean anything, the answer to the question just posed must be "no." The proper question, then, is not whether Congress is stripped of its commerce power, but rather whether its commerce power is trumped by the Amendment when a congressional act conflicts with state regulation of liquor, especially regulations dealing with importation.
98
Justice Stewart also suggested that New York was preempted by federal law from regulating Idlewild. To him, the state's attempt to regulate a business that was operating under federal Customs Bureau supervision presented a conflict beto transport intoxicating liquors within this state without a permit from the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board. provided the regulation adopted is reasonable and nondiscriminawry and is rea,_-.mably calculated to effect the purpose in view .. _") (emphasis added).
96. Hosreuer, 377 U.S. at 329. 97. Imagine that Congress passed a law prohibiting the shipment of printed materials critical of the United States government in interstate commerce. Would it be "absurd" to say in such case that the First Amendment had "repealed" the Commerce Clause to the extent necessary to protect freedom of speech? 98. Two of Stewart's other arguments employed to prevent Idlewild's closure arc non-sequiturs. The Court's brief decision upholding the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. § § 201-219a (2000 Supp.), which Stewart cites in support of his contention that the Congress's commerce power remained intact, did not purport to authorize alcohol shipments otherwise forbidden by state law. Moreover, Stewart's citation to Collins was also of no relevance to the case: the airport was not a federal enclave over which the federal government could claim dominion. Sec Hosreuer, 377 U.S. at 334-35 (Black, J., dissenting) ("The airport where the sales take place is not a federal enclave where even as to liquor federal law can constitutionally control, but is New York territory subject to New York, not federal jurisdiction."); Collins v_ Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 538 (1938). Commentators have mistakenly claimed that the warehouse was a federal enclave_ Sec, e.g., Freeman, 13 Hastings ConsL L.Q_ at 377 (cited in note 27) ("The unique facts in Idlewild-the presence of a federal enclave in the same physical space as a state facility-required a balancing of the federal and state regulating interests.")-tween federal and state authority. 99 But Justice Stewart's reference to Idlewild's federal sanction is maddeningly vague. His only statutory citation is to a provision of the Tariff Act of 1930, 100 which deals with duty-free exports from "bonded manufacturing warehouses" in general, and says nothing about preempting state authority where alcohol is involved. 101 This statute was passed two years before the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, and does not explicitly permit importation and storage of goods in bonded warehouses regardless of state law. One might also question whether it should be construed to preempt state laws passed pursuant to a later constitutional amendment.
Stewart 109 Stewart explained away Gordon with a reference to the trial court's finding that the tax in that case was not levied on importation.
110 As Justice Black pointed out in his dissent, however, "these labels cannot obscure the fact that both in Gordon and in this case the same conduct was involved: the physical importation of liquor from abroad into the State, at which point the State's interest in regulating or taxing the liquor came into play. Gordon did not-just as the Twenty-first Amendment does not-draw nice distinctions about where the imported liquor comes from. " 111 ment has completely repealed the Export-Import Clause so far as intoxicants arc concerned").
107. Sec also Versfelt, 75 Colum. L. Rev. at 1584-85 (cited in note 64) (noting that, as neither the text of the Amendment nor the history of its ratification makes any distinction regarding the source of the liquor, "[i]t would not ... have been so 'extraordinary' to conclude that the twenty-first amendment had 'repealed' the export-import clause with respect to intoxicants"); id. at 1585 ("The export-import clause's singular concern with shipments from abroad cannot distinguish it from the commerce clause, for the latter applies to foreign as well as domestic commerce.'').
108 If the ambi~uity introduced by the Court in the throughtransport cases' I-can be excused because the state regulations at issue did not directly address issues of "importation for delivery or use," Justice Stewart's two opinions are harder to explain. Stewart introduced uncertainty in cases squarely within the ambit of the Amendment's text, whose facts were indistinguishable from the Court's previous cases. While perhaps Hostetter could be understood as a preemption case, Justice Stewart's opinion seemed unwilling to put too much weight on that argument. Nor have subsequent Supreme Court and lower court decisions read the case so narrowly. Moreover, James B. Beam Distilling Co.'s dubious conclusion that the Amendment did not empower states to regulate foreign importation represented an abrupt about face from Gordon.
D. POST-HOSTETTER SUPREME COURT CASES
Subsequent opinions exploited this ambiguity and constructed an alternative line of cases. Those opinions built neither on Young's Market and its progeny, nor on the text and intent of the Twenty-first Amendment itself. Rather, they relied on the statements from Hostetter and James B. Bean Distilling that the power of the Twenty-first Amendment could be subordinated to other provisions of the Constitution, since both were "parts of the same Constitution" and that "each must be considered in the light of the other." These recent cases are selective in their quotations, however, and ignore Stewart's concession that a state was "unquestion [ 117 But two decisions in particular further eroded whatever state power remained under the Twenty-first Amendment. They are often quoted, along with Hostetter, in recent lower court opinions striking down state liquor regulation laws.
In 1980, the Court held that a California anti-competitive liquor pricing system could not be sustained under the Twentyfirst Amendment. 118 Writing for a majority, Justice Powell began his analysis of the state's Twenty-first Amendment defense to the Sherman Act claim on an oddly apologetic note, "In determining state powers under the Twenty-first Amendment," he wrote, "the Court has focused primarily on the language of the provision rather than the history behind it."
119 The language of the Amendment, Powell conceded, not only granted power over transportation and importation of liquor into states, but the Court's own early cases had also granted states "considerable regulatory power not strictly limited to importing and transporting alcohol. " To resolve conflicts between the federal and state governments, the Court must evaluate "whether the interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to the powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that the regulation may prevail, notwithstanding that its requirements directly conflict with express federal policics."132 On balance, the Court found Oklahoma's interests in regulating out-of-state transmissions and the selectivity of the ban (which covered wine, but not beer) wanting: "when ... a state regulation squarely conflicts with the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of federal law, and the State's central power under the Twenty-first Amendment of regulating the times, places, and manner under which liquor may be imported and sold is not directly implicated," the balance tips in favor of the federal government.
133
That same year, the Court held that Hawaii could not exempt a locally-produced liquor from an otherwise generallyapplicable twenty percent excise tax, 134 subjecting a state alcohol regulation to the very dormant Commerce Clause analysis the Twenty-first Amendment was intended to disable. In Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias, Justice White acknowledged that the Young's Market line of cases contained "broad language," but went on to say that the Court had come to "recognize[] the obscurity of the legislative history of § 2" and that "[n]o clear consensus concerning the meaning of the provision is apparent."
135
Whatever the intent or early cases indicated, Justice White continued, "[i]t is by now clear that the Amendment did not entirely remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from the ambit of the Commerce Clause." 136 Citing Hostetter and Midcal Aluminum, White concluded that "one thing is certain" about the Amendment: "The central purpose of the provision was not to 130 Some of these decisions might again be defended on the grounds that the state regulations at issue (the pricing statutes and the discriminatory drinking age, for example) had little to do with regulating importation for delivery or use. However, the Court did not make this distinction clear, instead further muddying the waters with broad statements suggesting that "temperance" was the only legitimate goal of state liquor regulation, and that any regulation smacking of economic protectionism was per se outside the ambit of the Twenty-first Amendment.
137. !d. at 276. As I have argued, the ambiguity that Justice White finds in the Amendment's legislative hist01y is of his own making. Moreover, the Young's Markee line of cases squarely refutes the claim of an "economic protectionism" exception to the Twenty-first Amendment. Yet, after muddying the waters in Hosleller, James B. Beam Disci/ling, and Midcal, the Court apparently thought that its sub silenlo abandonment of Young's Markee required no further explanation or justification.
138. One commentator observed that "[d]cspite assertions to the contrary, the Bacchus Court went beyond the Section Two precedents and found a new interpretation of the meaning or Section Two itself." Freeman, 13 Hastings Canst. L.Q. at 382 (cited in note 27). Despite the author's dissatisfaction with the reasoning of the majority's opinion, he approved of its conclusion. !d. at 386-87. According to the author of this comment, the drafters of the Twenty-first Amendment thought that it went no farther than the Webb-Kenyon Act, id. at 384; that the Amendment was merely intended to protect dry states, id.; and that the defeat of the proposed Section Three had no effect on the scope of Section Two. !d. at 384-85. The author presents little evidence to support his conclusions.
Justice Brennan, whose opinion in Capica/ Cicies Cable made clear that states still possessed tremendous power over imported liquor and its distribution within the state, did not participate in Bacchus Imporcs.
SMOKEY AND THE BANDIT
STATE LIQUOR LAWS AND INTERNET ALCOHOL SALES: RECENT CASES 329
The full effect of the post-Hostetter decisions-especially the uncritical certitude of Bacchus that economic protectionism was beyond the pale of the Twenty-first Amendment-is apparent in recent lower court cases striking down state regulations of liquor imports. These initial victories will, no doubt, encourage many more similar lawsuits against state liquor regulations. District courts, the courts of appeals, and, perhaps, the Supreme Court will be called upon to de(:ide these cases and, thus, will decide whether the Twenty-first Amendment will be truly a "forgotten clause" of the Constitution. After reviewing these recent decisions, and a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision that recently affirmed state power exercised under the Twenty-first Amendment, the following section suggests approaches that both the lower courts and the Supreme Court should take in future cases.
In Dickerson v. Bailey, 139 a federal district court judge struck down a Texas statute that prohibited the importation of more than three gallons of wine without a permit unless the resident p,ersonally accompanied the wine or liquor as it entered the state. 40 The district court, applying the "virtually per se rule of invalidity"
141 to which discriminatory laws are subject under traditional dormant Commerce Clause analysis, found that the statute "facially discriminates against out-of-state vintners and wine shippers" in order to "protect[ ] ... in-state liquor wholesalers and retailers at the expense of out-of-state wine sellers."
142
The Court rejected the State's claim that the Twenty-first Amendment authorized the law. Earlier decisions, like Young's Market, the judge wrote, had given way to a "balancing approach" in which the courts were no longer to assume that "the twenty-first amendment in essence repealed the commerce clause where liquor regulation was concerned." This new approach restricted the Amendment's "core" powers over transportation and importation where regulation is undertaken for the purpose of economic protectionism. 143. Id. at 706-07. The judge seemed to find no inconsistency between his applica-stress on language from Hostetter and Midcal Aluminum, and understood cases like Bacchus Imports to have grafted an "economic ,grotectionism" exception onto the Twenty-first Amendment.1 In a similar case proceeding through a federal district court in New York, a judge recently dismissed the State's motion to dismiss a challenge to New York's direct shipment and advertising ban. 145 Citing the "evolution in Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence" since 1970 when the state statute withstood a similar challenge, the district court felt that "it would be inappropriate" to deny plaintiffs the opportunity to present evidence in support of their claims that the statute violated the Commerce Clause. 1 " 6 Again, Midcal Aluminum and Bacchus Lion of a "per sc rule of invalidity" and his description of recent Twenty-first Amendment cases as requiring a "balancing approach."
144. Sec id. at 705 (citing Hosteuer's statement that it was "patently absurd" to argue that the Amendment n:pealcd the Commerce Clause); id. at 706 (citing Midcal for the proposition that "the relationship and effect on each other of federal and state interests" had to be weighed; that "there is no bright line between federal and state powers over liquor"; and Hosteuer's language that since both the Amendment and the Commerce Clause were parts of the same Constitution, each needed to be considered in light of the other), 707 (citing Bacchus Imports for the proposition that courts "have increasingly emphasized federal intcn;sts and more carefully scrutinized the actual purpose behind the state's law'' as opposed to deferring "to the amendment's express grant of virtually complete control to the states over importation and sale of liquor and structuring of a liquor distribution system within their own borders").
Following Judge Easterbrook's decision in Bridenbaugh, the district judge in Dickerson reconsidered the initial grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff, but af- 146. Id. at *7. The court "hasten[cd[ to add," in a footnote, that its denial of the motion to dismiss "is in no way [a] ruling ... upon the ultimate merits of the parties' respective claims." ld. at *7 n.l6.
Imports figured prominently in the court's conclusion that a jurisprudential "evolution" had taken place. 147 Finally, there is Bridenbraugh v. O'Bannon, 148 which was the first case to strike down, on dormant Commerce Clause doctrine grounds. In Bridenbraugh, state law outlawed the shipment of alcoholic beverages into the state to anyone except wholesalers, specifically including sales over the Internet. 149 In a brief opinion, the district judge dismissed the argument that the Twenty-first Amendment authorized Indiana's law. The court took "judicial notice of the historic setting of [the] Amendment" and asserted that "the second section of [the] Amendment had as its legislative purpose to permit states to regulate by local option, or indeed enforce statewide prohibition in regard to alcoholic beverages." 150 But neither of those goals, the judge continued, had "any bearing whatsoever to this case." The judge instead applied a balancing test: "whether the interests implicated by a state's regulation are so closely related to the powers reserved by the Amendment that the regulation may prevail, notwithstanding the fact that its requirements directly conflict with express federal policy. "
151
The only core principle protected by the Twenty-first Amendment is temperance, the judge concluded; because the Indiana statute facially discriminated against interstate commerce and was not obviouslr related to temperance, it had to yield to the Commerce Clause. ) 2 All of the district court opinions share a common flaw: They give unduly broad readings to Supreme Court opinions that do not directly address issues of state regulation of importation of alcohol, then proceed to apply them to situations covered by the express language of the Amendment. For example, as unconvincing as his distinction might have been, Justice Stewart took pains to characterize the arrangement in Hostetter as one not involving "importation ... for delivery or use therein" to avoid falling squarely within the Amendment's language and the Court's own prior cases. 153 Similarly, Midcal Aluminum turned on whether California's discriminatory pricing scheme-as opposed to regulations of alcohol imports-was protected by the Twentyfirst Amendment.
154
Even Bacchus Imports involved a question-whether Hawaii could offer a tax exemption to an otherwise generally-applicable tax for locally-produced liquor-much different than those posed by the recent cases, which strike at the very heart of what Midcal and Capital Cities Cable did not presume to question: the power of states to structure their liquor importation systems.
The confusion in the lower courts received a welcome corrective when the Seventh Circuit unanimously overturned the district court's decision in Bridenbraugh.
155
Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook recognized that " § 2 of the twenty-first amendment empowers Indiana to control alcohol in ways that it cannot control cheese" under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. 156 Rejecting the "core purpose" argument adopted by the district courts, and relying on the text and history of the provision, Judge Easterbrook concluded that, after the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, "[n]o longer may the dormant commerce clause be read to protect interstate shipments of li~ uor from regulation; § 2 speaks directly to these shipments." of the Amendment, he concluded, " § 2 would be a dead letter. ,Jss
As for the Supreme Court's case law allegedly forbidding the sort of statute passed by Indiana, Judge Easterbrook correctly noted that "[n]o decision of the Supreme Court holds or implies that laws limited to the importation of liquor are problematic under the dormant commerce clause." He read subsequent cases as "apply[ing] an unconstitutional conditions approach to the use of § 2 power," further explaining that "[w]hat the Court has held ... is that the greater power to forbid imports does not imply a lesser power to allow imports on discriminatory terms."
159 Thus, "unless the state has used its power to impose a discriminatory condition on importation, one that favors Indiana sources of alcoholic beverages over sources in other states, as Hawaii did in Bacchus," the Indiana law was constitutional.
160
Because he could find no such discrimination and because, in his opinion, the Indiana statute was exactly the sort of law intended to be passed under Section Two's grant of power, the court upheld the statute. In the only other case to reach the Court of Appeals, the Eleventh Circuit recently vacated a Florida district court decision upholding that state's direct shipment laws (which contain an in-state exemption), remanding the case for evidence regarding the purpose served by the statutory scheme. Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104 , 1106 (11th Cir. 2002 . "If the subject of Florida's regulatory scheme were an ordinary widget (rather than liquor)," Judge Tjollat wrote, "the statutes would violate the Commerce Clause. But if the State demonstrates that its statutory scheme is closely related to a core concern of the Twenty-first Amendment and not a pretext for mere protectionism, Florida's statutes can be upheld." Jd. While noting that the Supreme Court had not been particularly
V. A SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR FUTURE CASES
As Judge Easterbrook's opinion for the Seventh Circuit demonstrates, all is not lost. There is still hope for reviving the moribund Twenty-first Amendment; perhaps the spate of recent litigation over Internet alcohol sales will provide the tonic needed to arrest its complete demise. In this last section, I will put forth some principles that courts should employ when hearing cases involving dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state alcohol regulations-principles that follow directly from the history of the Twenty-first Amendment and the subsequent cases discussed above. Most of what follows seeks, as its intended audience, a hearing from the lower courts, although there may also be hope at the Supreme Court level.
162 Accordingly, I also have some suggestions for the Court.
A. LOWER COURTS
Remember the Text and Purpose of the Twenty-first
Amendment-Despite recent suggestions that only temperance, or some similar police power aim, can justify treating alcohol differently from other consumer articles under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, 163 the history of the Twenty-first Amendment, particularly the controversy over the original "saloon" section and its eventual rejection, and the text of Section Two make clear that the Amendment was about states receiving helpful on this question, it seemed to accept that the universe of the Twenty-first Amendment's "core concern[s]" was not exhausted by temperance. !d. at 1114-15. The court also noted that a state's scheme could be discriminatory without constituting "mere protectionism." !d. at 1113. One judge on the panel dissented, and would have upheld the district court's decision upholding the laws. !d. at 1116 (Roney, C.J., dissenting). Bainbridge, too, declined to follow Judge Easterbrook's analysis in Bridenbaugh. Id. at 1114 n.15 ("We disagree with the analytical framework used in that case and arc skeptical of its assessment of the facts.").
162. It is worth noting that, at present, three present members or the Court-Chid Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor and Stevens-have been among the most vocal critics of the Court's Twenty-first Amendment decisions. Sec Healy, 491 U.S. at 345, 349 (Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) ("by reason of the Twenty-first Amendment the States possess greater authority to regulate commerce in beer than they do commerce in milk''; acknowledging power that Twenty-first Amendment gives states over alcohol imports and alcohol distribution structure); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 586, 590-91 (Stevens, White and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that greater power of exclusion from state includes lesser power to impose conditions on sale, including power to require in-state sale prices be keyed to sale prices in other states); Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 278, 279 (Stevens, Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) ("I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Hawaii because the wholesalers' Commerce Clause claim is squarely foreclosed by the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.").
163. Sec, e.g., Shanker, 85 Va. L. Rev. at 383 (cited in note 3).
constitutional assurance of their power over the alcohol trade. Without Section Two, the states had no assurance against repeal of legislation like the Webb-Kenyon Act; and a change in personnel on the Supreme Court could have returned them to the days when the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine was employed to frustrate efforts to control alcohol importation. From this, a second point naturally follows.
State Alcohol Regulations Should Come to Court with a Presumption of Validity-
There is a certain irony that in the midst of the most vigorous judicial enforcement of federalism in over sixty years, a specific textual reservation of power to states has been eroded almost to the point of irrelevance. Even if the "new" New Federalism is not her cup of tea, respect for the text of the Twenty-first Amendment and its history ought to compel a judge to presume the validity of state alcohol regulationsespecially those that regulate the importation or transportation of alcohol into or through the state-regardless whether those regulations make doing business more expensive for retailers or consumers, or whether the regulations seem quaint or paternalistic. This presumption, of course, is not irrebuttable. As Judge Easterbrook suggests in his opinion, and as the Court itself has made clear, there are some limits to the state's power. While there is ample evidence that the framers and ratifiers of the Twenty-first Amendment sought freedom from the restraints of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, there is nothing to suggest that state alcohol regulators are to be free of the Due Process Clause 164 or the First Amendment.
165
Nor should the Amendment permit one state to control the liquor trade within its borders by reaching into other jurisdictions to regulate the liquor trade in that state.
166 The core power is the power to control the importation of alcoholic beverages for delivery or use within the state, and those ancillary powers that are necessary to effectuate that core power. sufficient attention to relevant facts that should counsel a narrower reading. Worse are the decisions that quote portions of Court opinions (especially those portions stressing the need to harmonize the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment, or that claim that it is folly to presume the Amendment "repealed" the Commerce Clause) and treat those as the proposition for which the cases stand. 168 The Supreme Court cases from which the choicest quotations are taken-Hostetter, Midcal Aluminum, Bacchus Imports, and the like-are factually distinguishable from the recent alcohol cases concerning Internet sales and direct shipment bans. 169 Lower courts should recognize that whatever state regulations the Court has stuck down, it has always been careful to preserve the state's power to regulate alcohol imported into the state for delivery or use. The Court's language on this point has been quite unambiguous. 175 Yet, in several key Supreme Court opinions (not coincidentally those in which the Court was curbing the power of the states) Justices have gone out of their wa~ to claim that the intent is "confused" or that it does not exist. 76 Freed from inconvenient facts, the Court is then able to substitute its own preferences for those of the Amendment's framers and ratifiers. If the Court cannot even discern what an amendment passed just sixty-odd years ago was supposed to accomplish, then one would expect to see a complete abandonment of all attempts to inform constitutional interpretation through the use of history. Since this obviously has not happened in recent years, the question then becomes why has the Twenty-first Amendment been treated any differently than other amendments? As I showed in an earlier section, the lack of clarity in the materials surrounding the ratification of the Amendment cannot suffice as a reason.
2. Clarify Status ofYoung's Market Cases-Even if doubts remained about the precise intent of the framers and ratifiers of nation of truck used in illegal transportation of liquor from South Carolina; rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to condemnation: "the Twenty-first Amendment removes spiritous liquors and alcohol from the protections of the commerce clause to the extent necessary to allow the States to adopt and enforce appropriate laws and regulations dealing with the subject, and thus to burden interstate commerce to this extent"); sec also No evidence from the framing or ratification of the Amendment suggests that foreign liquor was to be given some sort of privileged position. And the text of the Amendment certainly suggests that no such distinction was contemplated.
The text of the Amendment also offers no support for Justice White's bald assertion, made in Bacchus Imports, that whatever the framers and ratifiers had in mind, they did not intend to authorize states to engage in economic protectionism. In fact, in the months immediately after the ratification, state legislatures hurried to draft statutes exempting imported liquors from certain taxes and regulations, if their liquor was offered reciprocal exemptions by other states.
182 Along with at least one statement . 1 f" h h power -t ese reciprocity aws con Irm w at t e text suggests, viz., that there was no distinction made between "good" regulations of imports and "bad" ones. 184 in the Twenty-first Amendment, some states had feared economic discrimination by other states against their liquor products and several ... del!mcd it nccl!ssary to establish by statute what ... amount to reciprocal trade agreements."). The authors ignore what seems to bl! an equally plausible interpretation of lhl! states' actions: that the possibility of resultant discrimination against out-of-state liquor was seen as a possible byproduct of Section Two's grant of power. This cvidencl! of the states' understanding of the scope of the Amendment, moreover, contradicts a earlier statement in the same article that "[t]he second section of the Amendment generally was thought of as ... assurancl! that dry states would be protected from an influx of imported liquor" as opposed to authorizing '"state tariff laws." Id. at402.
183. Sec note 49 and accompanying text. 184. In his Bridenbaugh opinion, J udgc Easterbrook suggested that the Supreme Court, in some recent Twenty-first Amendment cases like Bacchus Imports, had been applying the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine: states may prohibit the importation of liquor altogether, but if it chooses to allow importation, it may not condition the ability to import on the payment of discriminatory taxes or the submission to discriminatory or protectionist regulations. Sec Bridenbaugh, 2000 WL at *5. Since Judge Easterbrook found no such discrimination in the statute, other than that authorized by § 2's grant of power, he upheld the Indiana regulatory scheme. Sec id While the unconstitutional conditions doctrine may furnish an l!xplanation for cases like Constantineau and 44 Liquormart, where the First Amendml!nt and the right to due process arc implicated, I think that it is inapplicable to cases like Bacchus Imports, in which locally-produced liquor was exemptl!d from an otherwise generally-applicable excise tax.
In her seminal article on the subject, Kathleen Sullivan ddined thl! unconstitutional c<Jnditions doctrine as holding "that government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether. It reflects the triumph of the view that government may not do indirectly what it may not do directly" under a greater-includes-the-lesser view of governmental power. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413 Rev. , 1415 Rev. (1989 . In the context of the Twenty-first Amendment, then, Constantineau and 44 Liquormart arc correct: just because the state may prohibit alcohol altogether, it docs not follow that it has carte blanche to extort waivers of constitutional rights as a condition of allowing its sale or purchase.
However, the application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to situations in which the state is allegedly engaging in discriminatory or protectionist regulation of outof-state liquor is more problematic. The right of an out-of-state commercial actor to be free from discriminatory treatment at the hands of state governments derives from the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment was understood to disable the dormant Commerce Clause as it applied to liquor-thus removing the "right" to import liquor free of stall! discrimination. Therefore, it seems that by allowing liquor to be imported, but subjecting it to discriminatory regulations not imposed on domestically-produced liquor, the state is not attempting to "do indirectly what it may not do directly"; rather, it is exercising the very power granted to It under the Twenty-first Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Recent lower court cases invalidating longstanding state alcohol regulations seem to have fallen under the spell of the Internet, and assume that "e-commerce must be free!" But as more courts have succumbed to the siren song of cyberspace, they have in the process ignored constitutional text, evinced indifference to the history of the Twenty-first Amendment, and misapplied Supreme Court precedent. They have, in fact, come close to effecting a virtual repeal of the Amendment. But there is opportunity in this new wave of litigation, the opportunity to repair the erosion of state power under the Amendment caused by years of parsimonious interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court. By keeping the text and the history of the Amendment squarely in view, courts can not only restore a measure of state power, but also protect the integrity of the amending process, as well.
In response to judicial restrictions on state regulation of the interstate alcohol trade, Congress passed a series of statutes granting such regulatory power to the states, the restrictions of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine notwithstanding. These congressional efforts culminated in the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, which inaugurated a fourteen year experiment with national prohibition. When the decision was made to end the experiment, state concerns about their ability to control the alcohol trade reemerged. The history of the Twenty-first Amendment's drafting demonstrates that its provisions were designed to allay those concerns by constitutionalizing state control over alcohol imported into states. Proponents and opponents of repeal both agreed that the power rightly belonged to the states, and were careful to eliminate the possibility of federal encroachment upon that power by eliminating the "concurrent power" provision, which would have empowered both the federal and state governments to regulate the saloon.
With that important change, what became the Twenty-first Amendment was sent to the states for ratification. The "drys" were assured that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine would not be revived to strike down state regulatory efforts; the "wets," too, were provided with constitutional assurances that dry forces could not use a concurrent power provision to reestablish some form of federal prohibition in the future. As the participants understood it, the main question regarding alcohol regulation was one of power. The Twenty-first Amendment settled it in favor of the states.
Early Supreme Court cases clearly reflected that understanding, refusing to rewrite the Amendment under the guise of interpreting it, even when the Court was presented with discriminatory state regulatory regimes. Since the mid-1960s, however, the Supreme Court has consistently made inroads on the power reserved to the states by the Amendment. Finally, in 1984, the Court signaled an intent to apply to state alcohol regulations the very dormant Commerce Clause analysis that the Amendment was intended to foreclose. At no time, moreover, has the Court made a convincing case for the correctness of its more recent decisions, as compared with its earlier decisions declining to supervise state control of alcohol. Recent lower court decisions have continued the virtual repeal of the Twenty-first Amendment by broadly construing the Supreme Court's restrictive cases, while ignoring important factual differences between those cases and the recent cases involving direct shipment bans that would prohibit, for example, Internet alcohol sales. If the trend continues, the Amendment will become a dead letter.
Were the matter of the Twenty-first Amendment simply one of cheap versus expensive liquor, or whether states ought to protect local interests as a matter of policy, I might applaud the actions of the Court. After all, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is a powerful judicial weapon designed to enforce the "common market" vision of the Framers-and so much the better for the Nation. But, as is so often the case when means are subordinated to ends in fashioning constitutional law, there are real costs to the approach the Court ultimately chose to take.
Perhaps the most serious cost of judicial abnegation of the Twenty-first Amendment is to the integrity of the amending process itself. As Laurence Tribe has noted, "[t]he resort to amendment-to constitutional politics as opposed to constitutional law-should be taken as a sign that the legal system has come to a point of discontinuity, a point at which something ... distinctly more radical than ordinary legal evolution is called for." 185 If members of Congress who propose amendments, and those in the states who are called upon to ratify them cannot be assured that the judiciary will respect the "constitutional politics" of the amendment when interpreting it, then one might for- give them for asking whether it is worth going to the trouble of proposing Article V amendments at all. Such treatment might also signal to the judiciary that amendments need not be taken seriously. 186 Thus does the alleged lack of importance of the Article V amending process become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Not only would the denigration of our amending process (so important to the Framers 187 ) be a loss for our constitutional regime, but it might have more ominous consequences for constitutionalism in general. For if the judiciary is not bound to respect the words and intent animating a relatively young amendment, then why should the Constitution's other, older textual boundaries command observance? The written nature of the Constitution was cited by Chief Justice John Marshall as one of the primary justifications for placing in the courts the power to review congressional acts for constitutionality. 188 Unfortunately, even in this age when, to paraphrase Thomas Jefferson, "we are all textualists, we are all originalists," the history of the Twenty-first Amendment shows that some members of the judiciary regard parts of the Constitution as less important than others. Thus, when contemplating the fate of the Twenty-first Amendment, it hardly seems alarmist to wonder whether other parts of the Constitution are similarly vulnerable.
